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Summary 
In this paper we carry out a meta evaluation of the international evaluation literature 
regarding active labour market policies (ALMPs). Many attempts have been made to 
estimate the net impact of reintegration measures on the individual job entry chance. So, 
the question is what conclusions can be drawn from the literature. How big is the net 
effect of reintegration measures? Our paper differs from earlier meta analyses of ALMP 
impact evaluations in the fact that we try to make inferences about the size of the net 
effect. To that end we analyze the size distribution of the net impact estimates resulting 
from the international evaluation literature. In our analysis we distinguish between 
different types of reintegration measures. Furthermore, we carry our regression analyses 
in which we explain the estimated effect found in individual studies from the type of 
measure, the labour market context and characteristics of the evaluation method used. 
A problem with the analysis is that different studies measure different things. Using 
the theoretical framework of hazard models, we analyze to what extent the different 
approaches can be related to each other and whether it makes sense to combine the 
different studies in one meta analysis. 
The results indicate that on average the net impact of reintegration measure is fairly 
small. As a result of reintegration job entry chances are probably not increased by more 
than 3 percentage points on average. The case is most convincing for training and 
counseling with average net effects ranging from 5.7 to 9.7 percentage points. The pos-
itive results for training are surprising. However, our sample hardly contains experi-
mental evaluations of training, which are usually seen as the most reliable evaluations. 
Overall we find that the net effect estimate tends to be smaller if an experiment is used 
for the evaluation. Hence, the results for training may be too rosy. If we account for the 
method used training comes out less well, while sanctions (which are treated as one type 
of measures) perform better. Wage subsidies and job creation come out poorly. We also 
find that the net impact of ALMPs depends on the socio-economic situation: it tends to 
be lower when unemployment is low than during a recession period. 
We see this paper as a first step and want to exploit the literature further. Recently, 
a lot of studies using a more developed methodology for non-experimental evaluation 
have appeared. It will be interesting to see to what extent inclusion of these studies in 
the meta analysis will alter the results. 
 
Zusammenfassung 
In diesem Papier nehmen wir eine Meta-Evaluation der internationalen Literatur zur 
Evaluationsforschung aktiver Arbeitsmarktpolitik vor. Zahlreiche Versuche wurden un-
ternommen, um den Nettoeffekt von Reintegrationsmaßnahmen auf die individuelle Ar-
beitszugangschance abzuschätzen. Somit ergibt sich die Frage, welche Schlussfolgerun-
gen aus der Literatur gezogen werden können. Wie groß ist der Nettoeffekt von Reinte-
grationsmaßnahmen? Unser Papier unterscheidet sich von früheren Meta-Analysen zur 
 
Evaluation des Effekts aktiver Arbeitsmarktpolitik dahingehend, dass wir versuchen, 
Interferenzen hinsichtlich der Größe des Nettoeffekts auszumachen. In dieser Hinsicht 
analysieren wir die Größenverteilung der Nettoeffektschätzungen, die sich aus der inter-
nationalen Evaluationsliteratur ergeben. In unserer Analyse unterscheiden wir zwischen 
verschiedenen Typen von Wiedereingliederungsmaßnahmen. Darüber hinaus nehmen 
wir Regressionsanalysen vor, in denen wir den geschätzten Effekt, der in einzelnen Un-
tersuchungen ermittelt wurde, mit dem Typ der Maßnahme, dem Arbeitsmarktkontext 
und den Charakteristika der verwendeten Evaluationsmethode erklären. 
Ein Problem der Analyse liegt darin, dass unterschiedliche Studien unterschied-
liche Effekte messen. Den theoretischen Rahmen von Risikomodellen nutzend analy-
sieren wir, in welchem Ausmaß die verschiedenen Ansätze miteinander in Bezug ge-
setzt werden können und ob es sinnvoll ist, diese verschiedenen Untersuchungen in 
einer Meta-Analyse zu kombinieren. 
Die Ergebnisse belegen, dass der Nettoeffekt von Reintegration im Durchschnitt 
vergleichsweise gering ist. Als ein Ergebnis kann festgehalten werden, dass sich die 
Reintegrationschancen wohl kaum um mehr als 3 Prozentpunkte erhöht haben. Am 
überzeugendsten stellt sich der Fall bei beruflicher Aus- und Weiterbildung sowie bei 
der Arbeitsberatung dar: mit durchschnittlichen Nettoeffekten, die von 5,7 bis 9,7 % 
reichen. Die positiven Ergebnisse für Ausbildung sind überraschend. Allerdings enthält 
unser Sample kaum experimentelle Evaluationen von solchen Maßnahmen, die übli-
cherweise als die verlässlichsten Evaluationen gelten. Generell haben wir herausgefun-
den, dass die Nettoeffektschätzung dann geringer ist, sobald ein Experiment für die 
Evaluation eingesetzt wurde. Deshalb können die Ergebnisse hinsichtlich Aus- und 
Weiterbildung zu rosig anmuten. Wenn wir die verwendete Methode berücksichtigen, 
stellt sich Ausbildung weniger gut dar, während Sanktionen (die als ein Maßnahmentyp 
behandelt werden) besser erscheinen. Lohnkostenzuschüsse und Arbeitsbeschaffungs-
maßnahmen erwiesen sich als mangelhaft. Ferner haben wir herausgefunden, dass der 
Nettoeffekt aktiver Arbeitsmarktpolitik von der sozio-ökonomischen Situationen ab-
hängt: Er ist tendenziell bei niedriger Arbeitslosigkeit geringer als während einer Rezes-
sionsphase. 
Wir betrachten dieses Papier als einen ersten Schritt und möchten weitere Literatur 
auswerten. In jüngster Zeit sind etliche Studien erschienen, die eine mehr entwickelte 
Methodologie zur nichtexperimentellen Evaluation benutzen. Es wird interessant wer-
den zu sehen, in welchem Ausmaß die Einbeziehung dieser Studien in die Meta-Ana-
lyse die Ergebnisse verändert. 
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1 Introduction 
In this paper we analyse the outcomes of the international evaluation literature on active 
labour market policies (ALMPs). The latter consist of various measures for the 
unemployed like job counselling and training to increase their job entry chances. During 
the past decades many evaluation studies have been carried out in various countries that 
try to measure the net impact of these measures on job entry. The net impact is the dif-
ference between the job entry chance of a person after participating in a measure and the 
job entry chance of the same person if he had not participated. Given the social impor-
tance of these measures and the large quantity of studies, an obvious question is what 
we can learn from this vast amount of studies. Do active measures have a positive effect 
on the transition probability from unemployment to employment? And if so, how big is 
this effect? Does it differ between different measures, between different social groups, 
etc? These are the questions we try to answer in this paper. 
Although earlier review studies (Heckman, LaLonde and Smith, 1999; Kluve and 
Schmidt, 2002) exist, these studies do not contain a systematic analysis of the outcomes. 
De Koning et al. (2005) made a first attempt to present the outcomes in a systematic 
way by counting (a) the number of studies with a significant positive effect, (b) the 
number of studies with mixed outcomes, and (c) the number of studies showing insigni-
ficant or significantly negative effects. This is done for the different ALMP measures 
separately. Kluve (2006) goes one step further by carrying out an ordered regression on 
the basis of such data. This allows him to take several context variables like the 
unemployment situation into account. Both studies come to similar conclusions with 
respect to the relative performance of the various types of measures. Job counselling, 
sanctions and intensified job search control and subsidies for job entry appear to be 
most effective. Job creation schemes perform poorly, while training holds an intermedi-
ate position. According to Kluve context variables do not play a big role. He finds some 
indications however that the net effect is higher in situations of high unemployment 
than in situations of low unemployment. 
Although these studies give some indications about the effectiveness of ALMPs, 
they do not answer the most important question, namely: how big is the net impact of 
ALMPs on job entry chances? In this paper we concentrate on exactly this question. To 
that end we analyse the size distribution of the net impact estimates emerging from the 
evaluation literature. Most studies are taken from the previously mentioned review 
studies. Other studies included in the analyses are: Blundell et al. (2004), Heckman, 
Smith and Clements (1997), Kluve (2002) and Van Rheenen (2003). 
We do this both for all ALMPs taken together and for the different ALMPs indivi-
dually. Furthermore, we carry out regression analyses in which we explain the net im-
pact estimates found in individual studies from factors like the sample size, the evalua-
tion method used, the economic and labour market context, etc. In view of the limited 
number of observations this is only done for the whole sample taken together. In these 
analyses possible differences in effectiveness between the different ALMPs are ac-
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counted for by including dummy variables representing the latter. And even then only a 
limited number of variables can enter the equation at the same time owing to the limited 
sample size. 
In judging ALMPs the net effect on individual job entry chances is a key aspect, 
but it is certainly not the only relevant aspect. First, costs are also relevant. According to 
the results found by de Koning et al and Kluve the most effective measures also seem to 
be the cheapest ones. However, we may not come to the same conclusion when we 
analyse the size of the impact. 
Second, comparing measures on the basis of short-term effects as we do in this 
paper may not be completely fair with regard to training and job creation schemes. We 
only look at impacts during the unemployment spell in which the intervention took 
place. Vocational training may take that long that it does not reduce the length of the 
unemployment period in which the training takes place or even prolongs it. However, 
when the training results in a significant increase in skills levels, it may reduce the 
chance that the people concerned will become unemployed again in the future. There-
fore, long-term benefits could be considerable. It should be noted, however, that al-
though this may seem likely, there is not much empirical evidence to support it. The few 
studies dealing with long-term effects of training show mixed outcomes (De Koning et 
al., 2005). 
Also with respect to job creation schemes one should be cautious in drawing con-
clusions from existing evaluation studies. Most of the literature concerning job creation 
deals with the transition from unemployment to regular employment, where people are 
counted as unemployed while being in the scheme. However, an important objective of 
job creation schemes may be to offer employment for people unlikely to find regular 
employment in the labour market. As the transition probability to regular employment is 
small for this group, such schemes may be useful even if they slightly reduce this transi-
tion probability (a result often reported in the literature). 
Third, indirect effects and aggregate effects might be important. The improved 
chances of the participants may, for example, go at the cost of longer job search spells 
for other job-seekers. This would imply that the aggregate effects of active policies are 
less favourable than the effects for the participants. However, a review of aggregate 
impact studies shows that aggregate outcomes are not too different from results pro-
duced by micro evaluation studies (De Koning, 2001). 
Finally, it might be important to take non-market effects into consideration. By 
non-market effects we understand the effects on health and social participation. A recent 
review study by Gelderblom and de Koning (2007) provides evidence from various 
studies that long-term unemployment increases the chance of health problems and social 
isolation. Hence, ALMPs that succeed in reducing unemployment duration may entail 
savings in health costs and social costs. In an integral cost-benefit analysis of ALMPs 
these savings should of course be taken into account. 
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While acknowledging the limitation of just looking at short-term effects of ALMPs 
on the job entry chances of ALMP participants, we still think that summarizing the 
evidence from the international literature on this point is an important step in increasing 
our understanding of the effectiveness of these measures. 
The paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we discuss the methods that have 
been used in the literature to assess the net impact of active policies on individual 
unemployment duration and job entry chances and how the different methods can be 
related to each other. This is important as we want to use the outcomes of the studies as 
observations for regression analyses. Hence, we want to use as many studies as poss-
ible. In section 3 the methodology of the meta evaluation is explained and the results 
presented. Finally, section 4 contains the conclusions and some final comments. 
 
2 Methods and What They Measure 
Methods to measure net impacts 
The most important question evaluations of active labour market measures should ans-
wer is whether a person participating in a measure gets a higher chance to find a job as a 
result of it. The fundamental problem posed by this question is that by definition we 
cannot observe what would have happened to a participant, if he or she had not partici-
pated. Therefore it is the task of the evaluator to find a convincing estimate for the latter 
(the so-called counterfactual). 
Experiments are seen as the most reliable method to construct the counterfactual. 
These are based on random assignment in two steps. In the first step a random sample is 
taken from the group that is entitled to a measure. Then, in the second step, this sample 
is divided randomly over two groups: the experimental group, which gets the treatment, 
and the control group, which is not treated. Consequently, the two groups are monitored 
over a sufficiently long period to judge whether the participants have a higher job place-
ment rate than the control group. The random assignment guarantees that the partici-
pants are representative for the whole target group and that the experimental group and 
the control group have the same composition (even with respect to unobserved charac-
teristics). Hence, the difference in placement rates between the two groups can be attri-
buted to the measure. Furthermore, the estimate for the net impact applies not only to 
the participants but to the target group as a whole. 
This, however, is only true for an ideal experiment. In reality, experiments often do 
not fully meet the requirements for such an ideal experiment. One can argue that the 
implementation of a measure during an experiment will usually differ from its full-scale 
operation. Another point is that as far as the monitoring is done by surveys, some of the 
participants and the control group may not be willing to answer the questionnaires. This 
non-response is then likely to be selective. Obviously, one cannot simply assume that 
the bias resulting from this selectivity is the same for the two groups. Heckman and 
Smith (1996) mention a number of factors implying that in practice experiments can 
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suffer from biased outcomes. The methods that can be used to correct for this bias are in 
fact the same as the ones that have been developed for non-experimental data. 
However, before we turn to non-experimental methods we want to stress that 
although experiments have their limitations, they are still more reliable than the former 
methods. In that respect it is a pity that there is so little room for experiments in most 
European countries. Two factors seem to be in play. The first factor is the fact that it is 
often seen as unethical to exclude people (the control persons) from treatment. How-
ever, this argument is questionable. Is it ethical to apply a measure on a wide scale to 
unemployed people without knowing that it is has favourable effects and with the possi-
bility that it has adverse effects (prolonging unemployment duration rather than reduce-
ing it)? If an experiment can give reasonable certainty about the net effect of a measure 
than this seems to be a valid reason to temporarily exclude some people from the meas-
ure. The second factor is of a judicial nature: legislation in some countries seems to pro-
hibit such an exclusion. 
In the case of a non-experimental evaluation one can try to select the control group 
in such a way that for every participant a non-participant is selected who resembles the 
participant closely. So, we can choose someone of the same gender, the same age, the 
same education, etc. Then we can again compare the two groups as to their job place-
ment rates. This method is known as the matching method. The problem with this 
method, however, is that we can never be sure that we control for all the relevant fac-
tors. Furthermore, it is often likely that some of the unobserved factors influences both 
the selection process and the chance of finding a job. Suppose, that we do not observe 
motivation. More motivated unemployed will tend to have a higher job placement prob-
ability than those with less motivation. But more motivated unemployed are also more 
likely to enrol in a program. They will show a higher interest in participation. Further-
more, program managers will prefer higher to lower motivated participants. If we then 
find that the job placement rate among the participants is higher compared to the con-
trols, it says nothing about the net impact of the program. The difference in placement 
rates may be wholly due to the difference in motivation.1
Because matching methods deal not completely satisfactorily with the selection 
bias problem, attempts have been made to deal with the problem by using econometric 
methods. Within the framework of the timing of events method Abbring and Van den 
Berg (2003) have developed such an approach . They consider two random processes: 
• the time that expires between entry into unemployment and entry into a program (the 
length of the unemployment spell up to enrolment in a program); 
                                                 
1 Within the context of the matching method the problem has been dealt with by looking at the dif-
ference in placement probabilities before and after the treatment. Then these differences are compared 
between the two groups. This is the so-called ‘difference-in-differences’ method. This method takes 
care of the selection problem as far as this problem is caused by unobserved factors that do not change 
over time. In principle, it is also possible within the framework of the matching approach to control for 
unobserved factors that change over time, but not in an entirely satisfactory way. 
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• the time that expires between entry into unemployment and the outflow from it (the 
full length of the unemployment spell). 
For both of these random processes a hazard model is used. In most cases it is assumed 
that the program does not take time and can be seen as a point in time.2 The impact of 
the program is then reflected by a change in the unemployment hazard from this point in 
time onward. Both spells will depend on observed and unobserved personal characteris-
tics. As far as the same unobserved characteristics affect both spells, the latter will be 
correlated. By taking this correlation into account the selectivity problem is tackled. The 
hazard approach will be treated in more detail in the next section. 
What do the various methods measure? 
Practically all experimental studies and matching studies in our sample compare the 
participant group with a control group on the basis of the cumulative job entry chance.3 
The latter is defined as the percentages of the people in both groups that have found a 
job between the moment of entry of the participants into the program and some point in 
time after they left the program. So, these studies show to what degree participants have 
a higher chance of finding a job compared to non-participants with the same characteris-
tics. In the remaining part of the paper we will also refer to these studies as E&M (expe-
rimental and matching) studies. Most other studies use the timings of events method 
(also to be referred to as TOE studies) and measure the effect of a measure on the 
hazard rate. Since the hazard reflects the outflow rate from unemployment one might be 
inclined to think that the latter studies measure the same thing as the former studies. 
However, as we will show below this is not the case. 
Why is it important to compare these two categories of studies (E&M studies 
versus TOE studies)? First, combining the two categories in one sample is important 
because of the relatively small sample size that we dispose of. After splitting up the 
sample we are left with two sub-samples that are hardly large enough to allow us mak-
ing reliable inferences for the different ALMPs. But even if the latter was possible, it 
would be important to relate the outcomes of the two sub-samples to each other. Do 
they point to the same conclusion concerning the net effect or to a different conclusion? 
Ending up with two conclusions drawn from two sub-samples of studies is not entirely 
satisfactory. 
A comparison between the two categories of studies is not straight-forward. Expe-
riments and matching methods do not make use of models while the TOE method does 
use a model for the assessment. So, in order to show the differences we have to use a 
                                                 
2 Some studies take the moment of exit from the program as the point from which on the hazard changes 
or try both options. 
3 Some studies compare the participant group with a control group on the basis of the percentage that 
has a job on a specific point in time after the participants left the program. This situation is dealt with 
in the annex to the paper. Because most studies that report this percentage also report the cumulative 
job probability, we do not distinguish the former as a separate category in our analysis. 
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theoretical mathematical model that encompasses both approaches. At first instance we 
use a simple model hazard model based on the assumption that the unemployment dura-
tion of an individual spell is a random variable from a exponential distribution. Later we 
discuss the implications of relaxing some of the assumptions of this model. 
Starting from an exponential duration model the probability density function of 
unemployment duration x is equal to: 
)exp()( xxf ββ −=  (1) 
In equation (1) f is the density function and β is the hazard. The latter is defined as the 
chance of escaping unemployment in an infinitely small time interval (where P refers to 
the probability distribution associated with f): 
β=≥+≤≤↓ h
txhtxtP
h
);(lim
0
 (2) 
Often evaluators assume that the program they are evaluating leads to a constant 
percentage change of the hazard:  
0
* )exp( tx ≥= γββ  (3) 
Where γ denotes the effect of the program on the hazard rate and t0 the time of the inter-
vention. Studies using the TOE method estimate γ using econometric techniques and 
often only report the estimate for γ (as well as the estimators for the other explanatory 
variables entering the hazard model).4
Now the question is what E&M studies are measuring and whether this can be 
related to γ. Only then both categories can be directly compared. Let us assume again 
that the intervention took place at time t0. Both participants and controls were unem-
ployed at the time. The probability that a control person who was unemployed at time t0 
found a job within a period of length d is equal to: 
)exp(1);( 000 dtxdtxtPP
cc β−−=≥+≤≤=  for a control person (4) 
and 
)exp(1);( *000 dtxdtxtPP
dd β−−=≥+≤≤=  for a participant (4)* 
From (4) and (4)* we can deduce that: 
⎭⎬
⎫
⎩⎨
⎧
−
−=
)1log(
)1log(log c
d
P
Pγ  (5) 
                                                 
4 Note that γ is not equal to the effect on the mean of the unemployment duration distribution. This 
effect also depends on the timing of the intervention during the unemployment spell. 
 6 
An important limitation of equation (5) in view of our intention to combine the two 
categories of models in one empirical analysis is that it does not define γ as a function 
of the difference between Pd and Pc. The problem is that E&M studies usually present 
their results in terms of this difference. Often Pd and Pc are not given individually. This 
would mean that E&M studies that report the difference between the two probabilities 
and TOE studies that only provide an estimate for γ cannot be compared and cannot be 
combined in one meta analysis. However, there might still be a way out of this problem 
if it were possible to approximate (5) by a relatively simple function in the difference 
between Pd and Pc. In order to explore the relationship between γ and Pd – Pc we did the 
following: 
• we took all combinations of the two probabilities in the range between 0,02 and 0,98 
with 0,02 intervals (so, we took 0,02, 0,04, 0,06, etc.); 
• for each combination we computed both γ and Pd – Pc. 
Figure 1: Scatter diagram of the simulated values for γ (gamma) and Pd – Pc 
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Figure 1 contains the data. Clearly, there is a positive relationship between γ and Pd – Pc. 
This relationship can be approximated by a linear equation fairly well. A linear regres-
sion gives the following results: 
 
2401;93.0
)098.0()004.0(
)(71.1175.4
2 ==
−+−=
−
NR
PPE sdγ
 
 7
Where the figures between brackets denote the standard errors. So, we find a very high 
adjusted R-squared. The constant term is practically zero. This suggests that for a wide 
range of values γ and Pd – Pc are indeed almost proportional. We only run into trouble 
with values of the probabilities very near to zero and very near to 1. However, such 
values are not realistic. 
One might also argue that even the fact that we derived a relationship between γ on 
the on the hand and Pd and Pc on the other hand does not mean a lot as we derived it 
from a very simple duration model which assumes that apart from the ALMP inter-
vention the hazard rate is a constant. However, it is important to note that equation (5) 
holds for a much wider class of hazard models, namely the mixed-proportional hazard 
models that are most often used in evaluation studies. The latter class of models allows 
the hazard to depend on time and on unemployment duration (taking duration-depen-
dence of the hazard into account, for example). For other duration models equation (5) 
holds in specific cases only. In the case of the Accelerated Lifetime Model (ALM) for 
example, where the explanatory variables scale the time rather than the hazard, equation 
(5) only holds for the exponential baseline hazard. So, equation (5) seems to apply to a 
fairly wide range of hazard models. 
Other assumptions made concerning the hazard model may be more restrictive. 
One of these assumptions is that the effect remains constant after the intervention. Bij-
waard (2002) estimates both a model with a time invariant effect of the intervention and 
a model where the impact may differ between the first ten time periods after the inter-
vention and the subsequent periods. The outcomes of the latter model suggests that the 
initial effect is higher than the long-term effect. 
A second assumption that is often made in TOE studies but seems to be question-
able is that program participation does not take time. In reality, participants in active 
labour market measures often stay in these measures for some time. Training courses, 
for example, may take several months or even longer. During participation the hazard 
rate will be different than before.5 A priori it is difficult to say whether it is higher or 
lower. In case of a training program it is probably lower. People will usually participate 
in a training program to increase their human capital under the assumption that this 
improves their chances in the labour market. Hence, they will reduce their job search 
intensity and concentrate on the training. However, other types of programs may have 
the opposite effect. Examples are the so-called Work First programs that have become 
popular in active labour market policy. Often an important element of these programs is 
that the unemployed have to carry out simple work in order to obtain their benefit. For 
those with higher qualifications being obliged to do such work will encourage them to 
look for a regular job. 
                                                 
5 It is even possible that the hazard rate changes before entry into a program, once people know that they 
are going to participate. Also here the effect can go in two directions. The prospect of participating in a 
program may imply that job search intensity is already reduced, if the program is seen as positive. This 
effect is also referred to as the Ashenfelter dip. However, if a client has a negative attitude towards the 
program he may try to find a job before entry into the program. 
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Relaxation of these assumptions will make equation (5) even more complicated, 
which further undermines the case for a common analysis. The fact that TOE studies 
often make use of assumptions that do not seem plausible also implies that one might 
question the validity of the outcomes of many of these studies. A study that treats the 
selection bias problem in a satisfactory way but makes unrealistic assumptions on other 
points may still produce unreliable outcomes. Non-experimental matching studies may 
suffer from the selection bias problem but are not subject to the other problems because 
they do not work with econometric models. So, the TOE studies in our sample may not 
be superior to the latter studies. May be this is different for recent TOE studies that start 
from more general assumptions. 
Conclusion 
Experimental evaluations and matching (E&M) studies often only report the difference 
between the job placement probabilities of participants and non-participants, while most 
studies using the timing of events method (TOE studies) only report the effect on the 
hazard rate. It appears that for a fairly general class of models (the mixed-proportional 
hazard model and even specific variants of even more general models) a direct relation-
ship can be derived between the program effect on the hazard rate on the one hand and 
the job placement probabilities of the participants and the non-participants on the other 
hand. However, this does not define a relationship between the effect on the hazard rate 
and the difference between the latter probabilities. Unfortunately many E&M studies 
only report this difference and not the underlying probabilities. Fortunately, for a wide 
range of values this relationship is almost proportional, making it relatively easy to use 
outcomes from both types of studies in one analysis. 
Different methodologies are used in the literature. Experimental studies and match-
ing studies compare participants with a control group of look-a-likes. These studies are 
not based on econometric models and thus do not rely on specific model assumptions. A 
disadvantage of the matching method is that it does not deal wit the selection bias prob-
lem in a satisfactory way. TOE studies are a second class of studies using non-experi-
mental methods. A major advantage of TOE models is that they allow for a satisfactory 
treatment of the selection bias problem. However, being based on econometric models 
the TOE studies in our sample often make simplifying assumptions. The most common 
assumption is that the impact of the intervention is constant after the intervention, which 
does not seem to be realistic. So, the TOE studies in our sample may not be superior to 
the matching studies contained in it. May be this is different for the younger generation 
of TOE studies. If the outcomes of TOE studies are unreliable owing to unrealistic as-
sumptions, this would distort the comparability with E&M studies. So, it is an empirical 
matter whether the outcomes of TOE studies and E&M studies can be combined in one 
meta analysis. 
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3 The Meta-Analysis 
Methods 
Plotting the size distribution of the net impact estimates from the available studies is an 
obvious way to get an impression of what these studies tell us. Furthermore, statistics of 
this distribution like the mean and the standard deviation are informative from this 
perspective. However, as we will see the variation in the estimates is considerable, even 
we look at each ALMP individually. Hence, it is interesting to look more closely at the 
possible sources of this variation. As we have shown in the previous section the method 
used for the evaluation is an obvious source for this variation, but there are many more 
like contextual differences (the studies in our sample refer to different countries and to 
different periods in time). Given our limited sample size it is not possible to deal with 
all these aspects in a descriptive way. An obvious way to deal with this problem then is 
to control for the various factors by conducting a regression analysis in which we use 
the outcomes of net impact studies as observations and the factors mentioned as expla-
natory variables. So we have: 
iii XNI εβ +=  (6) 
where NI denotes a net impact estimate, X stands for a set of factors influencing the size 
of the estimate and i is an index for the study. Furthermore, β is a vector with unknown 
parameters and ε an error term. 
The vector X may, in principle, contain the following types of factors: 
a) the type of measure: some measures may be more effective than others; 
b) design features of a given measure: training measures, for example, can take dif-
ferent forms as to duration, level and field; 
c) characteristics of the participants: a given measure may be more effective for some 
groups than for others; 
d) features of the implementation system: a system in which government agencies 
implement the interventions may produce different results than a system in which 
implementation is outsourced to private companies that have to compete for the 
government contracts; 
e) features of the implementation strategy: a given method may be implemented in dif-
ferent ways, with a different quality of the staff involved, etc.; 
f) characteristics of the evaluation method used: some methods (particularly non-expe-
rimental methods that do not correct for selection bias) may be less reliable and may 
systematically produce too optimistic results about the net impacts; 
g) the number of observation used: estimates are more precise when they are based on 
more observations; 
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h) the economic context: net effects may be different in a situation of low unemploy-
ment and high economic growth compared to a situation of high unemployment and 
low economic growth. 
i) The institutional context: the net effects of interventions may, for example depend 
on the financial incentives for unemployed jobseekers to actively search for jobs and 
to accept jobs even if the latter are less attractive. 
It is clear from this list that many factors may be of influence. Potentially, assessing the 
effect of some of these factors on the net impact is of high policy relevance. This is 
particularly true for the effect of design features and implementation strategies on net 
impact, because that type of information would provide recommendations about what 
could be done to improve ALMPs. However, at the moment we only have information 
about a more limited set of variables only. Collecting data on design and implementa-
tion of individual programs might be possible but would require a considerable effort. 
And even then the data will probably be far from complete. 
An aspect not included, but highly important is the destination after leaving unem-
ployment. It may be outflow to any destination or only outflow to a job. The studies in 
our sample are often unclear about this, although it will probably matter to the out-
comes. 
Data and descriptive analyses 
Our sample contains 28 articles and papers. Since some of these articles and papers 
report results for more than one participant group or for more than one type of measure, 
the total number of cases is much bigger, namely 155. Of these 155 cases, 73 cases 
report a positive effect, 43 a negative effect and 39 a non-significant effect. Table 1 
gives a summary per type of measure. 
Table 1: Breakdown of the available cases according to the sign of the effect 
 
Measure Sign (number of cases) 
 Positive Negative Not significant 
Training 41 12 13 
Counseling 10 1 3 
Sanctions 10 3 - 
Placement subsidies 2 7 8 
Job creation 2 7 13 
Other 8 13 2 
Total 73 43 39 
Three figures are depicted that show the size distribution of the net effects. Figure 2a 
contains all the cases. From this figure we can conclude that predominantly on the pos-
itive side there are a number of considerable outliers. From the figures 2b and 2c we can 
Figure 2: Size of the effect using (a) all observations (155); (b) observations except TOE (114); (c) observations TOE (41) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
conclude that the outliers primarily come from the applications of the TOE method. The 
figures suggest that the mean value of the net effect is close to zero. 
Table 2 contains a number of statistics with regard to the size distribution of the 
effect (minimum, maximum, average and standard deviation). Based on all observations 
the mean net effect is 0,051, which means that on average the job placement rate for 
participants is 5,1 percentage points higher than for non-participants. However, some of 
the TOE studies report extreme values, which cannot be interpreted within the same 
framework as the E&M studies. This leads to an extreme high standard deviation. Based 
on E&M studies only (the sub-sample emerging after leaving out the TOE observations) 
we find a mean net effect of 0,035 or 3,5 percentage points. But even here the standard 
deviation is considerable, implying a 95 percent confidence interval ranging from minus 
12 percent to plus 19 percent. 
Table 2: Descriptive statistics with respect to the various measures 
 
Measure Based on all 155 observations Without TOE observations 
 No. Min. Max. Average Standard
deviation 
No. Min. Max. Average Standard
deviation 
Training 66 –1.75 2.57  .109 .528 52 –.20  .39 .092 .117 
Counseling 14 –.10 .62  .130 .197 9 .03  .62 .120 .187 
Sanctions 13 –.01 .13  .034 .040 13 –.01  .13 .034 .040 
Subsidies 17 –1.43 1.65  –.056 .575 8 –.24  .17 –.004 .153 
Job creation 22 –.74 .85  –.084 .392 12 –.13  .08 –.027 .056 
Other 23 –.25 .92  0.051 .278 20 –.25  .12 –.029 .089 
Total 155 –1.75 2.57  .051 .406 114 –.25  .62 .035 .077 
If we look at the various ALMPs individually we can observe that the mean net effect is 
positive for training, counseling and sanctions. The means for training and counseling 
are not affected that much if we leave out the TOE observations. For sanctions we do 
not have TOE studies. The difference in mean outcomes for the whole sample compared 
to the sub-sample based on E&M studies is somewhat larger for subsidies and job 
creation, although for both measures the mean net effect is negative in both cases. For 
these measures TOE measures give a more pessimistic picture than E&M studies do. 
Finally, we have a category of other measures, which is highly heterogeneous. Hence, it 
is more difficult to interpret the results for this category. 
If we compare these results with the ones earlier obtained by de Koning et al. and 
Kluve, there is one major difference. In these studies training comes out relatively 
poorly, while it performs relatively well in our results. Subsidies, on the other hand, are 
performing worse in our case compared to the previously mentioned studies. One 
should add to that, however, that the latter measure shows the biggest standard deviation 
in our case (although this statistic is also very high for training). It is also important to 
note that our sample is not the same as the ones used by de Koning et al. and by Kluve. 
It is clear that the variation in the outcomes is considerable, even if we leave out 
the TOE observations and look at the various ALMPs individually. Hence, it would be 
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important to see whether we can explain at least some of this variation from characteris-
tics of the various studies. 
Estimation results 
In order to compare our data with the data used by Kluve (2006) we have started by 
carrying out the same type of analysis as he did, namely an ordered logit analysis in 
which the dependent variable indicates three possible situations: (1) the net effect is 
negative and significant, (2) it is insignificant, or (3) it is positive and significant. The 
results are given in Table 3. In the analysis ‘other’ measures are taken as the reference 
category. According to the results training, counseling and sanctions come out relatively 
well, while placement subsidies and job creation seem to be less effective. The un-
employment rate has a significant influence: the lower the unemployment rate is, the 
lower the net effect. A possible explanation for this result is that in situations of low un-
employment many unemployed will find a job anyhow. GDP growth is not significant 
in the equation. 
So, also in this regression we can observe the two differences with Kluve’s out-
comes that were pointed out in the previous sub-section: training comes out more posi-
tively in our analysis while subsidies perform less well according to our results. 
Table 3: Ordered logit model 
 
Dependent variable: Sign of the effect 
Number of observations: 152 
Explanatory variables Coefficient (standard error) 
Dummy Training 1.443 (0.531)* 
Dummy Counseling 2.015 (0.735)* 
Dummy Sanctions 1.956 (0.805)* 
Dummy Placement subsidies –0.551 (0.659) 
Dummy Job creation –0.086 (0.576) 
Economic growth –0.00069 (0.144) 
Unemployment rate 0.132 (0.053)* 
Threshold value between negative and not 
significant 
0.436 (0.642) 
Threshold values between not significant and 
positive 
1.723 (0.659)* 
Pseudo R-squared 0.12 
 
The reference measure is “other measures”. 
Inclusion of economic growth and unemployment leads to the loss of two observations owing to missings. 
* significant at least at the 10 percent level. 
We now turn to the regressions with regard to the size of the net effect starting from 
equation (6). We have estimated both models with and without the TOE observations. 
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In the model with the TOE observations only placement subsidies differ significantly 
from the other measures (Table 4). This measure appears to be less effective than the 
other measures. Job creation is also strongly negative compared to the other measures, 
but it is not significant. In this model the unemployment rate has a strong positive (and 
significant) influence. If we omit the TOE observations the adjusted R-squared in-
creases considerably, which illustrates the point made earlier that the results of the TOE 
cannot easily be compared with the other studies. In this model training is significantly 
more effective than ‘other measures’, the reference category. Job creation is now the 
worst performing measure, although its effectiveness does not differ significantly from 
that of ‘other measures’. Both the unemployment rate and economic growth are signi-
ficant in this equation. Both variables indicate that the net effects are lower the better 
the economic situation is. A possible explanation for the influence of economic growth 
is that this variable is related to the creation of new jobs and thus positively affects job 
the opportunities for the unemployed. In both regressions the relative performance of 
training, counseling, sanctions, placement subsidies and job creation is similar, but their 
relative performance compared to ‘other measures’ differs. 
Table 4: Regressions with regard to the size of the effect with and without TOE 
observations (the latter without correction) 
 
Dependent variable: Size of the net effect 
TOE observations included? Yes No 
Number of observations 152 111 
Explanatory variables Coefficient (standard error) Coefficient (standard error) 
Dummy training –0.008 (0.110) 0.083 (0.028)* 
Dummy counseling –0.016 (0.1445) 0.052 (0.039) 
Dummy sanctions –0.108 (0.148) 0.033 (0.035) 
Dummy placement subsidies –0.276 (0.145)* 0.004 (0.042) 
Dummy job creation –0.203 (0.129) –0.023 (0.035) 
Economic growth 0.020 (0.029) –0.028 (0.007)* 
Unemployment rate 0.045 (0.011)* 0.008 (0.004)* 
Constant –0.190 (0.133)* 0.044 (0.033) 
Adjusted R-squared 0.11 0.29 
 
The reference measure is “other measures”. 
* significant at least at the 10 percent level. 
In the previous section we have seen that TOE observations can be made more com-
parable with the other observations by multiplying the latter with a constant factor. This 
factor has been determined by taking the coefficients of the regression without TOE 
observations as our starting point. We assume that these coefficients represent unbiased 
estimates. Then a regression is carried out with the TOE observations to estimate the 
correction factor given the coefficients from the regression without the TOE observa-
tions. We find a value of 1.77, which is quite comparable with the value found in the 
previous section (1.71) based on simulated data. 
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When we apply the factor 1.77 to the TOE observations and carry out a new regres-
sion including the adjusted TOE observations we get the results shown in Table 5. The 
correction leads to a improvement of the adjusted R-squared. It is in between the values 
obtained with the two regressions shown in Table 5 (0.11 and 0.29, respectively). In this 
sense it helps to correct the TOE observations. The results are similar to the ones from 
the regression with uncorrected TOE observations. The only difference is that job crea-
tion is now also significant. We also experimented with different ways to adjust the 
TOE observations. An obvious alternative is to take account of the possibility that there 
is not only a scale factor, but also a constant in play. However, the results hardly differ 
from the outcomes in Table 5 when this idea is put to practice. 
Table 5: Regressions with TOE observations and with TOE correction 
 
Dependent variable: Size of the net effect 
Number of observations 152 
Explanatory variables Coefficient (standard error) 
Dummy Training 0.006 (0.090) 
Dummy Counseling –0.0170 (0.110) 
Dummy Sanctions –0.077 (0.134) 
Dummy Placement subsidies –0.199 (0.105)* 
Dummy Job creation –0.190 (0.129)* 
Economic growth 0.038 (0.025) 
Unemployment rate 0.034 (0.008)* 
Constant –0.216 (0.111)* 
Adjusted R-squared 0.19 
 
The reference measure is “other measures”. 
* significant at least at the 10 percent level. 
By using the sample means for economic growth and the unemployment rate we can 
compute average net effects for the various measures. Table 6 gives the results. 
Table 6: Average net effects for each measure based on the sample means of the 
context variables 
 
Measure Model without TOE observations (see Table 4) 
Model with corrected TOE 
observations (see Table 5) 
Training 0.088 0.097 
Counseling 0.057 0.088 
Sanctions 0.038 0.013 
Placement subsidies 0.009 –0.109   
Job creation –0.018   –0.100   
Other measures 0.005 0.090 
Average net effect 0.030 0.013 
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Using the model with TOE observations, the average net effect varies between –0.018 
(for placement subsidies) and 0.088 (for training). On average the net effect is fairly 
small (approximately 0.030). The model without TOE observations leads to an even 
smaller net effect (on average approximately 0.013). The main difference is that place-
ment subsidies and job creation come out much more negative in the TOE studies. For 
training, counseling and sanctions the differences are much smaller. Training appears to 
have a net effect of 8.8 to 9.7 percentage points; for counseling this is 5.7 to 8.8 percent-
age points. For sanctions small positive effects are found in both cases. For ‘other meas-
ures’ inclusion of the TOE observations improves the outcomes leading to a similar net 
effect as is found for training and counseling. 
The results can be interpreted as follows. A value of x for the net effect implies that 
a person increases his probability of finding a job by x percent points by participating in 
an ALMP. Assuming that a person’s chance to find a job is 30 percent without partici-
pation in a measure, this becomes 31.3 to 33.0 percent in case of participation. For some 
measures (like training and counseling) it might be much higher and for others (like 
placement subsidies and job creation) much lower (even lower than the reference situa-
tion of 30 percent, implying a negative net effect). It is important to repeat that most 
studies do not provide information about the level of job placement rates. For disadvan-
taged groups the chance of finding a job without participation in a measure can be quite 
low6, implying that an increase of 5.7 to 9.7 percentage points which was found for 
training and counseling may still be relatively high. But we do not know whether net 
impact for these groups is similar to the average level found in this paper.7
We also carried out regressions with the number of observations added as an expla-
natory variable. The problem is that information on this variable is available for a 
limited number of studies only. If we take the sample mean for the missing values and 
include this variable in the regression it appears to be significant with a negative sign. 
So, the net impact tends be lower the larger the number of observations. 
Furthermore, we have run regressions that included a dummy indicating whether 
the study made use of an experimental evaluation or not. In regressions without the 
TOE observations the sign of this dummy is negative. So, evaluations with a better 
methodology seem to lead to smaller estimates of the effects. The coefficient involved 
is, however, not significant. An interesting feature of the results is that in these regres-
sions the coefficient for training, although still significant and positive, becomes smaller 
in relation to the coefficient for counseling. 
The latter also happens in an extended model with TOE observations and dummies 
in relation to cases where the TOE method has been applied. In these regressions the 
                                                 
6 In the Netherlands the job placement rate for unemployed social assistance clients is approximately 20 
percent on an annual basis, for example. For those with an unemployment insurance benefit it is con-
siderably higher (35 percent). These are averages. For disadvantaged groups among the unemployed 
these figures are much lower. 
7 De Koning et al. (2005) conclude on the basis of a limited number of studies that net impact is prob-
ably higher for disadvantaged groups than for other groups, but this conclusion is based on the sign 
rather than the size of the effect. 
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dummy for experiments is negative and significant. Furthermore, in this model studies 
that use an experimental evaluation only produce positive effects in case of counseling 
or sanctions, not anymore for training. Hence the net effect of training might be smaller 
than Table 6 suggests, while the case for sanctions is probably stronger than the table 
suggests. However, the sample does hardly contain experimental evaluations of training 
programs. So, final conclusions cannot be drawn. 
 
4 Conclusions and Final Remarks 
In this paper we have used the outcomes of evaluation studies from various countries to 
make inferences about the average net impact of active labour market policies on job 
entry chances. Our conclusion is that this average net impact is fairly small. It is not 
higher than 3 percentage points if all ALMPs are taken together. This average effect is 
based on regression analyses in which the results of the studies are used as observations. 
The models allow for variation of the net impact between the various types of measures. 
Furthermore, the models control for the influence of the economic situation. For train-
ing and counseling the net impact may be around 7 percentage points. This may still be 
relatively high compared to the job entry chances that unemployed people have when 
they do not participate in such a program, which are probably not higher than 35 percent 
and often much lower. 
Our initial analyses suggest that training, counseling and to a lesser degree sanc-
tions and ‘other measures’ have positive net effects. Placement subsidies and job crea-
tion measures have a negative effect. The effect of training may have been somewhat 
over-estimated and that of sanctions somewhat under-estimated. The reason is that are 
hardly any experimental evaluations in our sample with regard to training. Although the 
available data is not sufficient to obtain a reliable estimate for the influence of the 
evaluation method (experimental evaluation or not), some of the regressions suggest 
that studies that do not use an experiment, or non-experimental evaluations that do not 
deal with the selection bias problem in a satisfactory way, may produce overly optimis-
tic results. 
According to our results the net impact of active measures is higher in situations of 
low GDP growth and high unemployment than under more favourable economic and 
labour market conditions. In the latter situation unemployment jobseekers are more 
likely to find a job anyhow. 
Clearly, our results should be treated with caution. First, the number of cases in our 
study is relatively small given the fact that we want to make estimates for the various 
ALMPs individually. Second, the number of studies on which the cases are based is 
even more limited. Third, it is not easy to relate the results of studies using the timing of 
events method to the results of the other studies. But if we exclude the TOE studies we 
are left with only 111 observations. Furthermore, the TOE studies are important as these 
are the ones among the non-experimental studies that deal in the most satisfactory way 
with the problem of selection bias. In principle, from the estimation results of the TOE 
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method the net impact of a measure on the job entry probability and on expected 
unemployment duration can be computed. Unfortunately, many papers do not contain 
this type of information. It would be recommendable for authors to present the results in 
such a way that a comparison with other studies is easier. In the present situation the 
best way to proceed is to collect more cases, both studies using the TOE method and 
studies using other methods, and apply separate analyses to both types of studies. Then 
in a second step we may investigate to what degree the results point to the same direc-
tion. When we have more cases it will also become possible to include more factors in 
the regression like target group characteristics. This would enable us to test whether 
measures work better for some groups than for others. 
From this exercise we conclude that the existing research into the impact of active 
labour market policies is to a large extent aimed at improving evaluation methodology. 
Researchers are less interested in presenting their results in such a way that these can 
easily be compared with the results of other studies. This leads to a situation in which 
on the one hand many studies are carried out, but on the other hand not much can be 
learned from the outcomes for policy purposes. We can observe a huge variation in the 
outcomes, but we can explain only a small part of it. 
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Annex A Model for the Case Where the Labour Market Status of 
Participants and Controls is Reviewed on a Certain Date 
In section 2 we stated that studies using experiments or matching methods use two ways 
of representing the effect on the job entry rate. The first one was treated in this section 
and refers to the chance that a person has found a job during some time interval after 
completing the program. The second one refers to the effect on the chance that someone 
has a job on a specific point in time (after completing the program). We now turn to the 
latter case. 
If we look at the chance of having a job on a specific point in time than we have to 
account for the fact that people who find a job after completing the program may lose 
that job and become unemployed again (and then find another job, etc.). In the most 
basic case where the spells of unemployment and employment are each distributed 
according to an exponential distribution this process can be described by a continuous 
Markov process, more precisely as a birth-mortality model with two statuses. The sta-
tuses are unemployed (status 0) and employed (status 1). Unemployment has a expo-
nenttial distribution with parameter β and job duration with parameter µ. Using Kolmo-
gorov’s Backward equation the probability that a person who was unemployed at time 0 
(status 0) is employed at time t (status 1) is equal to: 
))(exp()(01 ttP µβµβ
β
µβ
β +−+−+=  (A1) 
The parameters β and µ can both be interpreted as hazard rates. From equation (A1) we 
can conclude that if the probability to escape from unemployment becomes big then the 
probability of being in a job tends to 1 with the elapsing of time. If the chance that a 
person with a job becomes unemployed (µ) is very small the equation (A1) tends to the 
result obtained in section 2. So, only in the latter case the two ways of measuring job 
placement probabilities lead to the same result. 
Now suppose that at time 0 an intervention takes place which changes the hazard 
rate from unemployment to employment according to the following equation: 
)exp(* γββ =  (A2) 
Then the chances of having a job at time d for those treated (Pd) and for the control 
group (Pc) are equal to:8
))(exp()( **
*
*
*
01 ddP
d µβµβ
β
µβ
β +−+−+=  (A3) 
and 
                                                 
8 Notice that we assume that in case of repeated spells of unemployment the effect of the intervention 
stays intact. 
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c µβµβ
β
µβ
β +−+−+=  (A4) 
It is not possible to derive an explicit relationship between the job chances in the two 
cases and the impact of the intervention. Only asymptotically, for high values of d, this 
is possible. Then we have: 
( ) { } )/()exp(1 11 1)( **
*
01 µβγµβµβ
β
+=+=+=dP
d   (A5) 
and 
)/(1
1)(01 µβµβ
β
+=+=dP
c  (A6) 
implying: 
{ })1/1()1/1(log −−−= cd PPγ  (A7) 
This is approximately the same as equation (5) as long as the difference between Pc and 
Pd is small. 
So far, we have assumed that the hazard rate from employment to unemployment is 
not influenced by the intervention. If one takes a measure like training into considera-
tion this assumption may not be realistic. Training often takes so much time that the 
effect on the length of the unemployment period during which the training takes place 
may be small. However, training may considerably reduce the chance of future unem-
ployment, which would be reflected in a lower value of µ. Assuming that the effects of 
the intervention on both hazard rates is constant over time, we could compute the effects 
if we would have information on the two types of chances (the chance of ever finding a 
job after the intervention and the job chance on a specific time point after the interven-
tion) for the participants and the control group. 
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